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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF RIGHT OF INSPECTION INCIDENT TO OPTION

By M. T.

VAN HECKE*

T frequently happens that a tract of land or a business is sold

under such conditions that the only commercially sensible
arrangement is a tentative contract whose finality is to await the
results of a detailed investigation by the buyer into the characteristics of the seller's property. This investigation may be relatively
unlimited in scope and intended to create a basis for an independent judgment as to the desirability of the proposed purchase. If
so, the contract is likely to take the form of the conventional
option to buy. The inspection may, on the other hand, be limited to
designated items and intended as a substantiation either of the purchaser's previous understanding of the situation or of the representations of the seller which have already induced the present status
of the negotiations. In this case, the transaction is often described
in an instrument which in terms purports to be a present agreement to buy and sell the land or the business, with a privilege
reserved by the purchaser to withdraw upon specified conditions.
The buyer wants the seller to be so tied up that he (the buyer)
may be assured of the availability of the property if the examination turns out satisfactorily. And the seller, confidently expecting
that result, wants to bind the buyer as far as possible in advance.
Usually the provisions as to the ultimate purchase and sale, such
as price, terms, and closing, are clear. So also are those relating
to the details of the investigation, such as matters to be looked
into, which party is to bear the expense, extent of production of
data and co-operation from the seller, time during which it is to
*Professor of Law, University of Kansas, Visitinv Professor of Law,
Yale University, 1927-28.
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be made, and the time allowed for and the effect of notice of the
buyer's election to terminate the contract. As a rule, in this sort
of arrangement, the withdrawal is to be effective immediately
upon notice.
Careless draftsmanship occurs most frequently, however, in
the description of the precise condition of the purchaser's reaction,
after the inspection shall have been completed, which is to be a
prerequisite of his privilege to quit. Frequently, he "may cancel
this contract at any time" prior to a date mentioned. Often, he
may bring the deal to an end "if, in his sole discretion, the results
of the investigation are not satisfactory." Sometimes the clause
reads, "if the results are not reasonably (or substantially) satisfactory." Once in a while the election is conditioned upon failure
to discover certain designated matters to be in a described condition. Or, the option to terminate is to mature "if the seller's representations are not verified," either objectively or to the satisfaction
of the buyer.
Suppose, now, that the buyer in due time proceeds to the contemplated examination of the seller's property, seeking in good
faith to inform himself adequately before finally deciding whether
to complete or drop the purchase, and suppose, further, that not
because of any well-based quarrel with the purchaser's capacity to
go through with the deal, but because of either the seller's wish to
keep the property or to sell to a higher bidder, the inspectors are
met by the seller's refusal to permit the investigation and by his
repudiation of the entire transaction. What may the purchaser
do? Doubtless, he may elect to take the property sight unseen,
waive his privileges under the surrender clause, make the requisite
tender, and sue either at law for damages1 or (assuming no innocent purchaser has intervened) in equity for a conveyance.2 But
may he refuse to do any of these things, and, while his option to
withdraw remains open and unexercised, have specific performance
of the inspection privilege alone? The circuit court of appeals
for the eighth circuit has recently said no.' Before studying that
iGurfein v. Werbelovsky, (1922) 97 Conn. 703, 118 Atl. 32, and com-

ment 32 Yale L. J. 496; Lilienthal Bros. v. Stearns, (C.C. Or., 1903) 121
Fed. 197; Morse v. Tillotson (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1918) 253 Fed. 340.
2Gibson v. Riehle, (1914) 26 Col. App. 127, 140 Pac. 933; Robt. v.
Crawford, (D.C. App. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 339; Western Securities Co. v.

Atlee (1915) 168 Ia. 650, 151 N. W. 56; Livesley v. Johnston, (1904) 45
Or. 30, 76 Pac. 946; Electric Management and Engineering Corporation v.
United Power and Light Corporation (of Kansas) et al., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1927) 19 F. (2d) 311.

SElectric Management & Engineering Corporation v. United Power &

Light Corporation (of Kansas) et al., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d)
311.
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case in particular, however, let us look briefly at the more important legal-problems raised generally by the foregoing situation.
Although "there is always danger in applying a generic term
to a contract, and then subjecting it to the general rules controlling
contracts of that nature, irrespective of its special stipulations, '4
it may be observed that a contract of the sort under discussion
might be treated as either a present sale, a contract to buy and
sell, or an option to buy. Where the subject matter is land or
a building, it is difficult to conceive of so informal a writing creating a title thereto in the buyer. Otherwise, when the thing
bought and sold is the controlling interest in a business as represented by its corporate stock.5 Following the suggestion that "an
option to purchase if he liked is essentially different from an
option to return a purchase if he should not like," 8 it is believed
that the language summarized in the opening paragraph of this
paper would usually be construed to create a determinable, but
until determined a fully existing, bilateral contract to buy and sell,
as distinguished from the offer contained in the conventional
option.
Independently of these matters, the provisions governing the
inspection itself will be either of two types: an exchange of
unconditional -promises, on the part of the buyer to make the
investigation and on the part of the seller to facilitate it in a
co-operative spirit; or a similar promise by the seller, but with the
matter left optional as to the buyer. The first type is perhaps
the more usual. The distinction is, moreover, relatively immaterial, save as bearing upon the issue of consideration, for by our
hypothesis the purchaser has elected to inspect and is bringing
his bill to coerce the seller into allowing him to do so.
Consideration to support both the seller's promise to grant the
inspection and his promise to convey may arise from any one or
any combination of four sources. A seal will of course still have
its common law significance in some states. Usually these contracts recite the payment by the buyer to the seller of a small
amount of cash. Everywhere save in one or two states which
regard one dollar as insufficient, 7 this would fill the bill.8 Often
4

Brewer, J., in Guss v. Nelson, (1906) 200 U. S. 298, 302, 26 Sup. Ct.

260, 550 L Ed. 489.
Guss v. Nelson, (1906) 200 U. S. 298, 302, 26 Sup. Ct. 260, 50 L. Ed.
489.

6Wells, J., in Hunt v. Wyman, (1868) 100 Mass. 198, 200.
7

Hogan v. Richardson, (1924) 166 Ark. 381, 266 S. W. 299, noted in 9

MrxNzsoTA.
560.

LAw

REvmw 394; Rude v. Levy, (1908) 43 Colo. 482, 96 Pac.
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the buyer expressly undertakes to stand all or part of the cost
of the examination. Usually, he is to do so whether the matter
is mentioned or not. Where a corps of experts in accounting,
law or engineering is required to do the work, especially if apparatus for drilling or mining has to be brought onto the premises,
this expense may be large. Thus, either the express or implied
assumption of this responsibility or the actual expenditure of
money for that purpose (except where it was not contemplated
by the seller) has been held to constitute consideration. 9 If there
is an unconditional promise by the buyer to make the inspection,
this alone would furnish the necessary consideration for the
inspection rights. 10 But the authorities are divided,'1 as to whether
the mere promise to buy coupled with the limited withdrawal
privilege is enough. It is submitted that this promise is not
"illusory" if, in spite of the use of such sweeping language in
one clause as that previously quoted, the buyer's exercise of his
privilege to quit is by the whole tenor of the instrument, the
nature and main purpose of the inspection, and the character of
the transaction, to be predicated upon a fair and honest test, made
judicially and in good faith and not upon an arbitrary and capricious will irrespective of the facts. There is no room here for
purely subjective satisfaction in the sense of compliance with the
vagaries of individual taste, sentiment or feeling. Instead, especially where in large measure the inspection is to be made for the
purpose of substantiating detailed representations concerning the
characteristics of the property, the cancellation must be based upon
a judgment that can be checked objectively by the chancellor. 2
sChrisman v. Southern California Edison Co., (Cal. App. 1927) 256
Pac. 618; Brinkman v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., (1926) 120 Kan. 602,
245 Pac. 107; Baker v. Mulrooney, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1920) 265 Fed. 529;

Electric Management & Engineering Corporation v. United Power &

Light Corporation (of Kansas) et al. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d)
311. 9Stanton
v. Singleton, (1898) 6 Cal. U. D. 129, 54 Pac.
587; Michi-

gan Stone & Supply Co. v. Harris, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1897) 81 Fed. 928.
101 Williston, Contracts, sec. 61 at note 94.

"See Corbin, Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 Yale L J. 571,

583-589, 32 Yale L. J. 496; Patterson, Illusory Promises and Promisors'
Options, 6 Ia. L. B. 129, 134-152; but see 1 Williston, Contracts, sec.

104 at note 91; Tentative Restatement, Contracts, American Law Institute

(1926) secs. 77, 82 (e) and comment. Quare, Gibson v. Riehle, (1914)
26 Col.
App. 127, 140 Pac. 933.
12 Michigan Stone & Supply Co. v. Harris, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1897) 81
Fed. 928; Livesley v. Johnston, (1904) 45 Or. 30, 76 Pac. 946: Corbin,
Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 Yale L. J. 571, 583-589; Fry,
Specific Performance, 6th ed., sec. 1048; contra: Electric Management
and Engineering Corporation v. United Power and Light Corporation
(of Kansas) et al. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 311.
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If the difficulties incident to the inspection and withdrawal
features were absent, there could be little question of the specific enforceability in equity of the ultimate sale contemplated by
this type of contract, whether the subject matter be land, a business as a going concern,1" or the controlling interest in a corporation as represented by stock obtainable only from the defendant
and without a market price. 14 Relief at law could not adequately compensate the purchaser. The question would not be
whether a jury would be in a position to assess damages at all,'
but whether, however accurate the legal measure of damages
might be in this connection, any amount of money thereby obtained
would secure to the purchaser that (or its equivalent) to which
the contract was designed to entitle him. In other words, the
purchaser may insist that he has a right to obtain this land, or
a controlling share in this company, not in what someone else may
think a venture just as good. And the common law remedies
afford no way to get just that. 6 It is sometimes stated, however,
that equity will not give relief where the parties contemplate the
acquisition of the control of a public service corporation.17 But
it is not the mere transfer of control of such a company that has
been deemed offensive to public policy in these cases; rather, it
has been the means used to attain that end. Thus, in Foll's
Appeal,'8 the court felt that it would be lending itself to a speculative scheme of one man to manipulate the affairs of a bank with
a bare majority of the stock acquired upon borrowed capital, to the
likely injury of the bank. Similarly, in Gleason v. Earles,9 the
court was called upon to give effect to a pool of bank stock which
would take control out of the hands of those elected by the stock"3See Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contract, 3rd ed., sec. 16 at
note (e).

'4Mutual Oil Co. v. Hills, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1918) 248 Fed. 257; Moloney
v. Cressler, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1916) 236 Fed. 636; H. L. Doherty & Co.
v. Rice, (C.C.A. Ala. 1910) 186 Fed. 204, and (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1911)
184 Fed. 878; Newton v. Wooley, (C.C. Ark. 1900) 105 Fed. 541; Altoona Elec. Eng. & Supply Co. v. Kittaning & F. C. St. Ry. Co., (C. C. Pa.
1903) 126 Fed. 559; 2 Cook, Corporations, 8th ed., sec. 338; 22 A. L. R.
1032, annotation; Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd ed.,
secs. 17-19.
15As suggested in Rigg v. Reading, etc., Ry. Co., (1899) 191 Pa.
St. 298, 43 Atl. 212, and in Toles v. Duplex Power Car Co., (1918) 202
Mich.6 224, 168 N. W. 495.
' Pound, Progress of the Law: Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 430-432.
17Second headnote to the state report in Ryan v. McLane, (1900)
91 Md. 175, 46 At]. 340, 50 L. R. A. 501; first headnote to the state report in Foll's Appeal (1879) 91 Pa. St. 434, 36 Am. Rep. 671.
is(1879) 91 Pa. St. 434, 36 Am. Rep. 671.
'9(1914) 78 Wash. 491, 139 Pac. 213, 51 L R. A. (N.S.) 785.
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holders. And in Ryan v. McLane,20 the purchaser had made his
contract with a committee holding the stock of many owners under
a voting pool (itself deemed illegal) knowing that the committee
had by the contract violated restrictions upon its powers of sale.
The company involved was a railroad. There is no public policy
prohibitive of a contract to purchase and sell the controlling interest
in the stock of a public utility, when free from such inequitable
incidents or consequences. 2'
Moreover, if, as is often the case, it is alleged that the vendor
is about to dispose of the property, or has actually disposed of it
to one with notice, the original buyer under a specifically enforceable bilateral contract may have adequate interlocutory relief to
preserve the status quo at least until a hearing may be had on
the merits. 22 He is entitled thus to be assured of the continued
availability of the property, especially where it consists of easily
negotiable securities. Otherwise, a successful ending to the
litigation would be a barren victory.
And, just as clearly, (still assuming the absence of any option) the buyer may have appropriate equitable relief against any
attempted disruption of his express or implied right to inspect
the premises or to be furnished with information concerning them.
The decided cases bearing upon this point are few, and they
deserve more than passing attention. Three will be considered in
the text.
Sinith v. Peters" was an action for specific performance of a
contract to sell a house and fixtures, the former at a named price
and the latter at a price to be designated after an appraisal by a
Mr. Lound. The latter attempted to make the valuation but was
denied access to the house by the seller. Upon motion, the court
compelled the vendor to allow the entry and to enable the appraisal
to proceed, saying, in the course of the opinion:
"I have no hesitation in saying that there is no limit to the
practice of the court with regard to interlocutory applications
so far as they are necessary and reasonable applications ancillary
to the performance of its functions, namely, the administration of

justice at the hearing of the cause. . . . The defendant has ad20(1900) 91 Md.175, 46 At. 340, 50 L.R. A. 501.
21lH. L.Doherty & Co. v.Rice, (C.C.Ala. 1910) 186 Fed. 212.
22H. L. Doherty & Co. v.Rice, (C.C. Ala. 1910) 186 Fed. 204; McClure
v. Sherman, (C.C. Mont. 1895) 70 Fed. 190; Currie v. Jones, (1905)
138 N. C.189, 50 S.E.560; Zeiger v.Stephenson, (1910) 153 N. C.528, 69
S. E. 611; Rau v. Seidenberg, (1907) 53 Misc. Rep. 386, 104 N. Y. S.
798; Elliott v. Jones, (1917) 11 Del. Ch. 283, 101 At. 872; 2 Cook,
Corporations, 8th ed., sec. 338, 363.
23(1875) L. R. 20 Eq. 511.
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duced no evidence in defence of his conduct; he has obstructed
Mr. Lound in the performance of the duty which he has agreed
that he should perform. Can it be tolerated, in a country where
violence is not allowed, in which Mr. Lound and his clerks would
not be permitted to force an entry, although in pursuance of an
agreement, that a court of justice shall say no provision can be
found for such a case, and that it shall be permitted for defendant
to say, 'Although I have sold this furniture and fixtures at a valuation to be made by Mr. Lound, a valuer of my own choice, I will
at my will and pleasure so obstruct Mr. Lound in the performance
of his duty, and prevent his completing the valuation which I have
already contracted he shall make?' I do not believe it to be the
law of this court, and I do not believe it will ever be so decided."24
Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co.,25 presented this situation. The
defendant owned the only available commercial supply of crystalline garnet in the United States. It used only a portion of
this in its own manufacturing operations, and contracted to sell
to the plaintiff a certain quantity to be delivered before a date
mentioned. In the same instrument, it gave the plaintiff an option to purchase, during a five-year period, the entire output of
the mine in excess of defendant's requirements. It also agreed
to furnish to the plaintiff, six months prior to the beginning of
this period, written information as to the amount of ore on the
property, its own requirements, and its capacity for delivery, and
to core-drill the mine for this purpose. The plaintiff made repeated and unsuccessful attempts to obtain the stipulated information. There were delays and adjustments concerning the original
order which are not material now. This was a bill for specific
performance of the agreement to furnish the information. The
plaintiff had previously exercised his option as to the excess over
the five-year period, sight unseen, as it were, but under the facts
alleged in his bill he claimed the privilege to elect whether to apply
for specific performance of the contract for future deliveries or
to waive specific performance and sue for damages. He averred,
however, that he could not intelligently make that decision without
the promised information. The court overruled a demurrer to the
bill, saying in part:
"The relief which the plaintiff asks for in the first instance is
analogous to discovery by an inspection of the mine. Discovery
is sought to enable the plaintiff not only to elect his remedy, but
to determine his damages in case he elects pecuniary compensation
instead of specific performance. In such a situation the trial
24
Smith v. Peters, (1875) L. R. 20 Eq. 511. See to the same effect,
Morse v. Merest, (1821) 6 Madd. 26.
25(1925) 81 N. H. 535, 129 Atl. 374.

This is an excellent opinion.
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court will do what justice requires. Details of performance and
supervision can be provided for in the decree. If discovery of
the capacity of the mine proves unreasonably burdensome to the
defendant, justice may require that the work be performed by the
plaintiff himself at the defendant's expense. All such questions
properly arise at the trial and can be disposed of there by the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. .

.

. Affirmative relief may

be denied if to grant it would mean an unwarranted invasion
of individual rights, or necessitate an impracticable amount of judicial supervision. But the precise remedy eventually awarded,
whether specific performance or an injunction against a breach of
defendant's negative promise, must of necessity depend upon an
equitable 26consideration of all the evidentiary facts and circumstances.

2 7
To a similar effect is Johnston v. Frederick Stearns & Co.

There the defendant corporation sold a number of shares of its
own stock to the plaintiff employe, to be paid for out of the
earnings of the business. The sale was made in consideration
of the employe's services and to induce his taking a greater interest
in the success of the enterprise. A certificate was issued to him,
reciting that the stock was held by the company as collateral until
paid for. The seller reserved a preferential option of repurchase,
upon the employe leaving the service of the concern, at a price
equal to the amount of earnings to be credited on account of the
stock. Five years later, the plaintiff left the company, and called
for an adjustment of the stock account. This being refused, the
employe sued for specific performance of the contract in the event
the stock should be found to have been fully paid for out of the
profits of the preceding five years, and asked for an accounting,
to be had under the direction of the court, of the net earnings
during this period and of the proportion of those earnings which
should be credited on the stock represented by the certificate. A
demurrer to the bill was overruled, the court observing:
"But it is to be noted that the means of ascertaining whether
and the time at which the net earnings of these shares had
amounted to sufficient to cancel the obligation were necessarily
within the control of the defendant. We can conceive of no
reason, therefore, why the complainant is not entitled to have an
accounting of the business sufficient to determine the question
of whether these shares have been fully paid or if not what proportion have been paid, and, if paid for out of the earnings of the
26(1925) 81 N. H. 535, 129 Atl. 378, 379. The cases cited by the court
have been omitted here. See also, the tacit adoption of a similar doctrine in Stanton v. Singleton, (1898) 6 Cal., U. D. 129, 54 Pac. 587, at
page 589 of the Pacific Reporter.
27(1910) 160 Mich. 247, 125 N. W. 29.
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company, at what time such payment was concluded. This to our
mind is the chief purpose of this bill. The accounting is not, as
suggested, merely incidental to a specific performance of the contract. It is the real basis or at least a sufficient basis for the interposition of a court of equity. .

.

. As to the scope of relief which

complainant is entitled to, it is perhaps not essential that that be
determined on this hearing; but we see no difficulty such as it is
claimed by the defendant exists. It is suggested that the court
cannot decree specific performance to [by?] the complainant of
the provision that he shall not offer this stock to others for sale
until it has been offered to the defendant. While this may not
entitle the complainant to the stock, relieved of such a condition,
it certainly does not relieve the defendant of the obligation to
transfer the stock upon being fully paid, and the court would
have power to protect the defendant in that respect by its final
decree."28
Now, it will be recalled that the courts in the cases just discussed and cited have been unwilling to deny the plaintiff relief
upon a mere demurrer to a bill, but have insisted that the case
should go to a hearing upon the merits so that a final judicial discretion might be exercised after all of the relevant facts had been
gone into. It appearing from the allegations of the bill that the
purchaser has had a legitimate need for information, there has
been no balance of injuries so visible upon the pleadings alone as
to outweigh the good that a decree might do. This, whether the
information was to be furnished by the seller to the plaintff in
a given form, or produced through an investigation to be conducted
by the purchaser himself, by a third person, or by the seller. The
precise theory of relief has varied from accounting, an analogy
to discovery, or specific performance, to injunction, as the nature
of the coercion necessary has required. Whether defendant has
had an option to repurchase, the plaintiff an election between
specific performance and damages, or the plaintiff was bound to
proceed, the courts have vigorously expressed confidence
in their capacity to tie up all the loose ends and protect
both parties by a properly framed conditional decree. The seller
has not been allowed to take advantage of delay caused by his
own wrongful conduct. Far from being turned back by objections that the court was undertaking to enforce only a part of the
transaction, the judges have found in the production of the information a sufficiently important objective independent of the enforcement of the ultimate aspects of the contract as a whole. And
28160 Mirh. 252, 125 N. W. 29. The cases cited by the court have
been omitted here.
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the difficulties attendant upon any personal services involved
have been either ignored or gotten around by a negative decree.2 9
There seem to be no reported decisions opposed. The Pennsylvania case of City of Williamsport v. Citizens' Water & Gas
Co.,30 where it was held that mandamus and not a proceeding in
equity was the proper remedy to compel a water company to
permit a city about to acquire the waterworks to inspect its books
and plant for the purposes of evaluation, goes off on this distinction: There was no contract involved. The city's option to purchase (which had been exercised) and the defendant's duty to
permit an inspection were brought into existence by a statute3'
which fixed the price upon an original cost and maintenance basis.
Nevertheless, two of the justices dissented. One of them said:
"The object of this proceeding is to compel a conveyance of
property under the terms of the statute. This involved an accounting in order to determine the value of the property and the amount
to be paid therefor. The case is one in which the services of a
chancellor are peculiarly appropriate and desirable, in order to
dispose of the questions involved, justly and equitably to all
parties concerned. Any remedy that may be attempted upon the
and inadelaw side of the court will be uncertain, inconvenient
32
quate.

I would sustain the jurisdiction in equity.1

When we turn from the interim protection possible to a purchaser under a bilateral contract to buy and sell, to that which
is afforded to an optionee under the conventional option to buy,
in advance of his exercise of that option, we find an apparent but
quite distinguishable split of authority.
It should first be noticed, however, that almost everywhere both
law and equity courts protect the optionee, when the option is
either under seal or for a valuable consideration which has been
paid, against the usual effects of any attempted withdrawal of the
33
offer by permitting later acceptance to create a new contract.
Thus to recognize the continuance of the offeree's power to accept
is equivalent to a specific performance of a more or less implied
promise to keep the offer open and not to revoke it during the
2

9See especially, Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., (1925) 81 N. H. 535,
129 At. 378.
3o(1911) 232 Pa. St. 232, 81 Atl. 316.
-'This distinction was recognized in Town of Boonton v. United
Water Supply Co., (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 536, 91 Atl. 814; affirmed in memo.
opinion
32 in 84 N. J.Eq. 197, 93 AtI. 1086.
City of Williamsport v. Citizens Water & Gas Co., (1911) 232 Pa. St.
232, 254, 81 Atl. 316.
33McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 644; 3 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 1441; Pound, Consideration in Equity, 13 Ill. L. R. 667,

676.
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period mentioned. This rests in large part upon a realization that
the commercial world demands absolute performance by the optionor. "The purchaser of an option to buy or sell land pays for
the privilege of his election. It is that very privilege which the
other party to the contract sells." 34 The purchaser, as to this
aspect of the transaction, where consideration is present, has fully
performed. The court is called upon to enforce the only executory
phase of this branch of the contract. Of course, in nearly all of
the decided cases, the offer has been accepted and the price tendered, so that the court is really called upon not for interim protection alone but for an order compelling the conveyance itself. In
other words, for specific performance of the contract resulting
from the acceptance of the offer. Nevertheless, when the optionor
made his abortive attempt at withdrawal, which was subsequently
ignored and its usual efficacy denied, the offer had not been
accepted and might never have been. For the period allowed in
the contract, indirect relief without the aid of any decree has
therefore been afforded by both the common law and equity substantive law to the optionee3 5
It is a mere circumstance that there have been relatively few
reported cases where the optionee has found it advisable or necessary, in advance of his own acceptance of the offer, either to prevent the optionor from selling the property involved or from violating any duty to furnish the information upon the basis of which
the election was to be made. But this fact should not, while the
prescribed period is still unexpired, prevent the occasional needy
one from having the direct aid of a court of equity to assure the
forthcoming of that information and the continued availability of
the property. The seller has been as fully paid in this case as in
that where the seller merely tries to withdraw; his obligations are
just as fixed, and the optionee's need for the continuance of his
privileges is just as real. In a word, the same commercial necessity
exists here as a reason for the direct intervention of a court of
equity that serves as a basis for the irrevocability of the offer. A
properly framed decree will protect the optionor by releasing the
property upon the lapse of a period equal to that originally set
by the contract if an acceptance has not been made, and by so controlling the production of information or the inspection as to work
J., in Watts v. Kellar, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 56 Fed.
1, 4. 34Caldwell,
- Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 Yale L. J.641. 648-649; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, 26 Yale L. J. 169, 190; 3 Williston, Contracts, sec.
1441.
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the least hardship possible, especially where the optionee is to
stand the expense thereof. The problems of personal service,
delay caused by the seller himself, and performance of only a
part of the transaction at this time, should be no more disturbing
than in the bilateral contract cases previously discussed.
Nor is there any appreciable difficulty in the way of the court's
administrative handling of the defendant. When the court permits
the optionee by a timely acceptance to create a bilateral contract
in spite of an attempted revocation of the offer, no decree relating
directly to the attempted revocation is necessary. It is merely overlooked. If the court is asked to prevent a threatened disposition
of the property, the only judicial action called for is an easily
enforceable injunction. If interference with a proposed investigation to be made by the plaintiff is to be prevented, the decree
again is negative. The court does not have to try to make the
defendant act affirmatively against his will. If the seller is to
produce certain records and written instruments, the making and
enforcement of this order is no more formidable than the timehonored relief of ordering a conveyance. And if the seller is to
make certain tests as a basis for the ascertainment of the data
called for, the court, as was said in Kann v. Wausau Abrasives
Co.

36

"will do what justice requires. Details of performance and
supervision can be provided for in the decree. If discovery of
the capacity of the mine proves unreasonably burdensome to the
defendant, justice may require that the work be performed by the
plaintiff himself at the defendant's expense. All such questions
• . . can be disposed of . . . by the exercise of sound judicial
discretion."
There is only one situation where the court is likely to hesitate
before the prospect of making the defendant go through with his
preliminary duties, namely, that of submitting a valuation to arbitrators to be appointed by the parties. Traditionally, it has been
feared that the defendant's nominee, by refusing to function properly, may render the whole proceeding futile. This has served to
prevent the granting of this sort of relief, except where the work
of appraisal was to be done by a person previously agreed upon
and whose probable integrity appealed to the court, and where the
court has in substance been asked to order a conveyance at a
reasonable price. The courts have compelled the seller, as has
been seen, to submit to and to permit an appraisal by the single
36(1921) 81 N. H. 535, 129 Ad. 374.
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valuer in the exception first mentioned, 37 and in the other to sell
at a price determined by some substitute for the unworkable
arbitration by nominees. s
There is, of course, this novel feature to be considered. The
optionee, while seeking the aid of a court of equity to prevent a
threatened sale of the property and to compel the defendant's
co-operation in the production of the promised information, insists
upon the continued existence of his own power to elect whether
or not to accept the offer. Now, it has often been pointed out that
two aspects of this transaction are to be kept separate in our thinking about the feature just mentioned, 9 as they were kept separate
in the minds of the parties. One is the seller's offer to make a
bilateral contract. The other is the unilateral contract to keep the
offer alive, not to dispose of the property, and to facilitate a production of certain information. There is no duty on the optionee
to buy until the offer has been accepted. But since he has not
asked for the property itself we need not concern ourselves with
that phase of the matter now. And so far as the objects actually
in suit are concerned, the optionee has already done his part. He
has promised, and is under a duty to make the inspection. The
consideration for the seller's obligations, in most cases, has been
paid. And even if the contract were under seal, the optionee has
made, we are assuming, a bona fide attempt, supported by litigation,
to undertake the inspection contemplated by both parties to the
contract, if an opportunity can be obtained. In other words, he
has given or tendered to the vendor all that the latter was entitled
or expected to receive for his own undertakings. For when we
remember that the production of data was by the contract to precede and furnish a basis for the optionee's election, it is impossible
to imagine that the seller could ever have desired a promise to buy
(i. e., a favorable election) as the price of his own duty to furnish
that information.
Let us now look at the cases, first as to the interim protection
against a threatened sale, and second as to inspections.
37(1875) L. R. 20 Eq. 511; Morse v. Merest, (1821) 6 Madd. 26;
Snodgrass v. Gavit, (1857) 28 Pa. St. 321; Hostetter v. Pittsburgh,
107 Pa. St. 419.
(1884)
38
These cases are collected in Muthal Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, (1915)
214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856. On the specific performance of arbitration contracts see note in 31 Yale L J. 670, and an article by Hayes in
1 Corn.
L. Q. 225.
39
Corbin, Option Contracts, 23 Yale L. J. 641, 648-649; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, 26 Yale L. J. 169, 190; 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1441.
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One of the most striking is Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co.4 0 A contract under seal, but apparently
without any consideration other than the respective promises, provided that if the racecourse, which lay alongside the canal, should
ever be proposed to be used for dock purposes, the owner would
give the canal company the "first refusal" thereof. The optionor
entered into negotiations with a third company for the sale of the
property for dock purposes and then offered it to the optionee at
a price greatly in excess of what it expected to obtain from the
third company. This was refused and a counter-offer of a supposedly reasonable price rejected. The trial court's decision is
thus summarized:
"The right of the canal company to have the 'first refusal' of
the property had arisen; a 'refusal' implied an offer, not at any
price, however extravagant, the racecourse company chose to
41
ask, but a price which some other person was willing to give,
and which the canal company could, if they chose, accept, and
which it was within their statutory powers to accept. And the
learned judge granted an injunction restraining the racecourse
company from selling the racecourse to any person or company
without having first offered it to the canal company at the same
cash price that the intending purchaser ... was offering; and also
an injunction restraining the defendants from completing or carrying out [the proposed deal
42 with the third company] unless and
until that had been done.
This was sustained upon appeal, on the ground that the contract
involved an implied negative undertaking, 43 and in spite of a showing that the optionee could not actually buy without "taking fresh
statutory powers," this having been known to both parties from
the beginning. The question of mutuality was not discussed.
There is apparently but one case contra, namely, Peacock v.
Deweese.44 There the optionee, in advance of any acceptance, was
refused an injunction against the optionor parting with the property. The price and time were fixed, but the option was neither
under seal nor supported by consideration, unless the latter could
be found in the provision that the optionee bound himself to make
such tests for ochre as were satisfactory to himself. Whether
2 Ch. D. 37.
See also, 1 Williston, Contracts, secs. 43, 61. But see Fogg v. Price,
(1888) 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741, and compare Hayes v. O'Brien, (1894)
149 Ill.
403. 37 N. E. 73, 23 L. R. A. 555; Monroe v. Crabtree, (1916) 178
40[1901]

41

Ia. 546. 159 N. W. 979.
42[1901] 2 Ch. D. 42.

4'Compare Kennerly v. Simonds, (D.C. N.Y. 1917) 247 Fed. 822.

44(1884) 73 Ga. 570.
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he had made any tests does not appear. Nor did he ask to be
permitted to make any. The main ground for refusing to enjoin
a sale of the property to others was the finding that the agreement
was gratuitous and entirely voluntary. In other words, the case
was probably one where neither law nor equity would have permitted the optionee, after an attempted withdrawal of the offer,
to have created a contract to sell by an acceptance in time. All
of the Georgia code provisions cited show the real trouble to have
been lack of consideration. But the court then went on to say:
"The contract in this case is not mutual and binding upon all
the parties thereto. The plaintiff in error may comply at his option
or will; there is nothing in the writing that compels him to do anything for the benefit of the defendant in error. Equity will not
decree the specific performance of a contract against one party,
where, by the terms of the contract, no specific performance could
be decreed against the other party."45
The contrast between this apparently unnecessary bringing in of
the now thoroughly repudiated mutuality notion of Mr. Justice
Fry, 4 and the complete freedom from any similar dogma of the
Manchester Case,47 not to mention the square repudiation of the
doctrine's applicability in the decision next to be discussed, is due
solely to the absence of consideration.
In Town of Boonton v. United Water Supply Co.,4 8 an optionee

was given interim relief as to an inspection almost as a matter of
course. A contract between the town and the water company for
water service provided that the town might purchase the waterworks and at any and all times might inspect the books and
vouchers of the company. Consideration existed in the town's
patronage of the company under the contract. The town demanded
the right to make an inspection without first exercising its option
to purchase. The New Jersey court of chancery held that it was
entitled to make the inspection and that mandamus was not a
proper remedy, saying in part:
"From my examination of the case I have reached the conclusion that the relief prayed for by the complainant should be granted. There is no doubt in my mind that, read in connection with
the other provisions of the contract, the words 'at any and all
times,' which appear in paragraph eleven, mean that the water
45Peacock v. Deweese, (1884) 73 Ga. 571.
-See
Cook, The Present Status of the 'Lack of Mutuality" Rule,
36 Yale L. J. 897; Clark v. Andrew (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d)
958.
47[1901] 2 Ch. D. 37.
48(1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 536, 91 Atl. 814; affirmed in memo. opinion in
84 N. J. Eq. 197, 93 Atl. 1086.
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company bound itself to give the inspection, even if the town did
not exercise its option to purchase. The privilege, it appears, was
incorporated in the contract to give Boonton a chance to know
the true conditions before it should agree to exercise its option.
This is frequently done where the public is concerned and is to be
the purchaser. And it is no doubt true that without such right
it would be difficult to get the people at large to sanction the making of a contract such as the one under consideration. .

.

. The

suggestion made by counsel for the defendant, that the relief
should not be granted because there is a want of mutuality if this
is done before the town exercises its option, cannot prevail in view
of our decisions, and further this contract by its terms gives this
right of inspection to the town authorities-a right not given to
the company. In other words, one party to this contract has a
right which the other has not. The principle of mutuality cannot
apply under these circumstances. .

.

.

No hardship is suffered

by the water company by an order for inspection as such order
can be so framed as to prevent the inquisitive but disinterested person, or any competitor, if there be one, from coming to knowledge
of the company's affairs. In accordance with these views, an
order for inspection may be entered."'49
That the court appreciated the significance of its views is indicated
by the cases cited in support. Madison Association v. Brittin"
was an option to purchase conditioned not only upon the payment
of the price but the entering into of an agreement by the purchaser
later to erect and maintain a building on the premises. The court
felt itself competent to protect the seller in this connection and
refused to dismiss the purchaser's bill for a conveyance on that
account. And the court in the famous Lajoie Case51 found mutuality to exist in spite of the plaintiff's privilege to dismiss the
ball player upon ten days notice.
Apparently the only case that might be construed as a holding
contra, is the 1915 decision of the New York court of appeals in
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Stephens.5 2 The insurance company,
as the lessee of certain real estate, had an option to purchase at
a value to be fixed by arbitrators to be appointed by the parties.
This was to continue for six months after the completion of such a
valuation. The court refused at the suit of the optionee to order
the vendor to proceed to a valuation by the appointment of his
arbitrator until the plaintiff had bound itself to purchase by an
49(1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 537, 91 Atl. 814; affirmed in memo. opinion
in 84 N. J. Eq. 197, 93 At. 1086.
50(1900) 60 N. J. Eq. 160, 46 Atl. 652.
5lPhiladelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, (1902) 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973,
58 L. R. A. 227.
52(1915) 214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856.
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acceptance of the offer. Four things should be noticed about this
case.
(1) The holding of the lease was ultra vires on the part of
the plaintiff corporation, but because improvements had been made
in reliance upon its terms and because the vendor had recognized
the plaintiff as tenant and had accepted its performance to date,
the court was unwilling to allow the vendor to escape his obligations on that account. One wonders, however, if the court did
not feel that partly because of this factor, the company was asking
too much when, before exercising its option, it was calling upon
the court for specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate
the value. Putting it another way, if an ultra vires transaction
was to be enforced at all, then the plaintiff ought to do everything
within its power, even if that called for a waiver of some of its
privileges under the contract, before asking the court to assume
the considerable burden of providing a substitute method of arriving at the value in lieu of the method provided by the contract.
(2) The court was mainly balked by a feeling that to order'
the already resisting defendant to appoint an arbitrator, when it
seemed more than likely that the nominee would refuse to act
impartially, would constitute a futile gesture. Conceding that
courts have sometimes, by a reference or otherwise, determined the
value of property in actions for renewal of leases or for conveyances of property at a value to be fixed by arbitration, it pointed
out that that had been done only where the arbitration provisions
were incidental and subsidiary to the main purpose of the suit and
the courts were able to take the view that the contract method of
arriving at the value was a matter of form rather than of substance. The court then went on to say:
"The only reason that occurs to me for requiring an appraisal
in advance of the determination by the plaintiff to purchase is that
it is necessary to enable the plaintiff to make its decision. But if
that be so, the provision for an appraisal must be such an essential
part of the contract that it can be enforced, if at all, only in the
manner agreed upon. .

.

. And yet courts will not compel t)arties

to name appraisers who may nullify the decree by refusing to
serve. .

.

. If it is a mere matter of form, the plaintiff can decide

as well before as after an appraisal whether it desires to purchase." 3
(3) The court held that the outstanding privilege of the plaintiff to determine whether or not to buy deprived the case of necessary mutuality.
53 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, (1915) 214 N. Y. 496, 103
N. E. 856-58.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

"The general rule is now thoroughly established in this state
that a contract must be mutual in its remedy to warrant a decree
for its specific performance. Wadick v. Mace, 191 N. Y. 1, 83
N. E. 571; Levin v. Dietz, 194 N. Y. 376, 87 N. E. 454, 20 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 251. .

.

. The defendants however, could not have

the remedy of specific performance either to compel an appraisal
or to compel the plaintiff, after an appraisal, to exercise its option
to purchase. .

.

. However, it is not essential that the mutuality

of remedy shall exist at the inception of the contract. Owing to
the defendant's refusal to name an arbitrator, the plaintiff's time
to exercise its option has not expired. It may still elect to purchase, and thus supply the missing quality of mutuality of remedy,
which will entitle it to specific performance." 54
The court ignored the fact that by its payment of rent and making
of improvements upon the strength of the lease, the plaintiff had
given to the lessor exactly that which under the contract the latter
was entitled to receive in exchange for his agreement to keep the
offer open and to arbitrate the value. The cases relied upon and
the form of the utterance just quoted have been adversely criticised, both by a federal court5" sitting in New York and by Dean
(now Mr. Justice) Harlan F. Stone in his article, The "Mutuality"
Rule in New York.5 6 And the New York law of mutuality has
been changed by the now .famous opinion of Judge (now Chief
Judge) Cardozo in Epstein v. Gluckin,57 decided in 1922:
"What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice or
oppression either to plaintiff or to defendant. Mutuality of remedy
is important in so far only as its presence is essential to the attainment of that end. The formula had its origin in an attempt to fit
the equitable remedy to the needs of eqtial justice. We may not
suffer it to petrify at the cost of its animating principle."
Judge Cardozo concurred, it is true, in the decision of Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Stephens. It is believed, however, that, applying
the attitude just expressed to the facts of that case today, he would
have found "the needs of equal justice" satisfied by the same
considerations which led the court largely to ignore the ultra vires
aspect of the lease. Since he also concurred in In re Fletcher,"
64 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, (1915) 214 N. Y. 496, 108 N. E.
856-58.
55Union Bag & Paper Corp. v. Bischoff,

Fed. 187, 190.

(D.C. N. Y. 1918) 255

16 Col. L. R. 443.
233 N. Y. 490, 493-494, 135 N. E. 861. See Cook. The
Present Status of the "Lack of Mutuality" Rule, 36 Yale L. J. 907, and
Durfee. Mutuality in Specific Performance, 20 Mich. L Rev. 289.
58(1924) 237 N. Y. 440, 143 N. E. 248, noted in 34 Yale L. J. 98, holding the New York Arbitration Law inapplicable to this situation.
56

57(1922)
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it is probable that he would again reach the same result but
mainly because of the administrative impracticability of handling
the defendant's nominee upon the board of arbitrators.
It is also true that in Epstein v. Gluckin, the plaintiff assignee
of the vendee had done just what the court wanted the plaintiff
optionee in the Mutual Case to do: he had bound himself to take
the land and to pay for it by bringing his bill for a conveyance.
Literally, therefore, it might be said that the utterance of Judge
Cardozo has no effect upon the present significance of the "mutuality" notions expressed in the Mutual Case. 9 There are two
answers to that. One is that Judge Cardozo, although agreeing
with the Mutual Case that "mutuality" did not have to exist at
the time and by virtue of the terms of the contract, disagreed with
the earlier pronouncement by refusing to state the principle in
terms of what would have happened if the facts had been reversed
and the defendant had been trying to get relief against the plaintiff.
Instead, he gave voice to an administrative policy to be applied
in the face of what has actually happened, a policy that gives much
greater promise of adequate consideration to what the plaintiff has
actually done and is likely to do than was ever possible under the
earlier approach. The other answer, closely allied to the first, is
that until the assignee in the Epstein Case had become bound to
take and pay for the land he had given nothing to the vendor for
his obligation to sell, whereas in the Mutual Case, the plaintiff, who
was not asking for the land but only for the valuation, had already,
in his occupancy of the premises, his improvements in reliance
upon the lease, and his payments of rent, fully compensated the
vendor for the requested preliminary performance. 0
(4) In any event, it is clear that the doctrine of the case of
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Stephens is without any prohibitive
effect upon the specific performance of informational privileges
antecedent to the exercise of plaintiff's option where no mental
hazards such as those derived from the elements of ultra vires and
drbitration are present.
Add, now, a single element, or, preferably, substitute for the
unconditional bilateral contract and the option to buy previously
discussed, a bilateral contract in which the buyer reserves the
59As was said in Electric Management & Engineering Corporation
v. United Power & Light Corporation (of Kansas) et al., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1927) 19 F. (2d) 311.
60Gibson v. Riehle, (1914) 26 Col. App. 127, 140 Pac. 933, is subiect
to the same distinction. So also, is Kennerly v. Simonds, (D.C. N.Y.
1917) 247 Fed. 822.
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power to withdraw, and what difference does it make? The seller
has the buyer tied up far more definitely than in the option but
not quite so definitely as in the absolute contract to buy. The
withdrawal privilege, as we saw at the beginning of the paper, no
matter how sweepingly phrased, is to be exercised not upon the
basis of sheer whim but of a bona fide use of the material sought
to be obtained. The buyer may be compelled, regardless of the
allegations or prayer for relief in his bill,"' to go through with the
ultimate purchase if the results of a proper test ought to satisfy
him even if he insists that they do not, should the court's discretion
demand this condition as the only fair correlative of the seller's
performance. The court need not go that far, however, especially
where the terminable promise to buy was not the sole consideration given for the right of inspection, when the court can see from
the fact that the possessor of the power to quit has gone to expense
and this litigation to obtain the information that he is not likely
to exercise his power lightly and without adequate cause, and
where, because verification of the seller's representations is so
much the primary purpose in view, nearly everything will depend
upon whether the seller was truthful and accurate at the time and
has not wrongfully changed conditions since. By the hypothesis,
the seller does not have to divest himself of his property and then
wonder if the buyer will take and pay for it; he has been and is
about to be furnished that which at the time of the contract's execution he apparently thought was an adequate exchange for his
undertakings in respect to information. His is the only executory
aspect of this part of the transaction, precisely as in the option
case. Everything that has heretofore been said applies again with
equal force here. We need only consider one new phase of the
stock contention.
Namely, that the outstanding power in the plaintiff to withdraw
robs the case of some supposed mutuality. This aspect of the
"lack of mutuality" doctrine has been so elaborately worked out
in the treatises 62 and in this63 as well as other periodicals,6 ' that
61
See Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale L. J. 259,
280-291; and note 93, post.
1442; Pomeroy, Specific Performance
623 Williston, Contracts, sec.
of Contracts, 3rd ed., sec. 169, note (e) at p. 438; Summers, Oil and
Gas 63241-271, 628-634.
Note in 10 MINNESOTA LAW RE IEW 169.
64
Articles and notes in 49 Am. L. Reg. 327, 334, 460; 3 Ill. L. Rev.
601-615; 58 U. Pa. L. Rev. 16; 27 Yale L. J. 261; 11 Ia. L. Rev. 69; 34
Yale L J. 385, 571, 583-589.
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it would be presumptuous indeed to go over the ground in detail
again. The whittling down6" and final albeit indirect repudiation "
by the Supreme Court of its dictum in Rutland Marble Compani
v. Ripley,8 7 which started all the trouble, and the quick legislative
nullification of Rust v. Conrad6 because of its adverse effect upon
the mineral development of Michigan, are well known. It has
often been demonstrated that the courts which have sustained the
contention have been misled by the mechanistic statement of the
principle of mutuality which makes relief depend upon what would
have happened if the situation had been exactly the opposite of
what it actually is; that partly because in that event the power
to quit in the hands of a then (as assumed) recalcitrant party
would have rendered a decree futile, these same courts have confused the effect of a termination privilege in the plaintiff's hands
with that of one in the defendant; that they have sometimes been
moved by considerations of hardship and unfairness; that the,
have failed to distinguish cases where the plaintiff agreed to buy
only what he should want to buy 9 without any possible basis for
determining the amount; and that they have mistakenly relied upon
cases where the plaintiff was suffering from the disability of coverture70 or infancy 7' or where the rendition of purely personal services by the plaintiff, still executory and uncompleted, was to constitute the consideration for the defendant's obligations.7 2 With
65See the cases cited in 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1442, at note 17,
and particularly Philadelphia Baseball Club v. Lajoie, (1902) 202 Pa.
210, 51 At. 973, 58 L. R. A. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 627, as well as 49 Am.
L. Reg.
327, 334, 460.
16 Guffey v. Smith, (1915)

856.

237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed.

67(1870) 10 Wall. (U.S) 339, 359, 19 L. Ed. 955.
68(1882) 47 Mich. 449, 11 N. W. 265, 41 Am. Rep. 720. See Mich.
Laws 1883, Act No. 73; and Grummett v. Gingrass, (1889) 77 Mich. 369,
43 N.
W. 999.
6

9E. g., Hutchinson Gas and Fuel Co. v. Wichita Natural Gas Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1920) 267 Fed. 35. At p. 43, Sanborn, J., distinguishes
',e oroblem here being discussed: "Counsel cite cases in which suits for
specific performance brought by holders of options to discontinue their
performance at will . . . were sustained by the court; but in those
cases neither the continuance of performance by the optionee for a fixed
term nor their covenant so to continue was any part of the consideration
of the agreements by the defendants to continue performance." And
see note 77, post.
70E. g., Luse v. Deitz, (1877) 46 Iowa 205. See Horack, The Doctrine
t

of Mutuality in Iowa, I Ia. L. Buil. on, and Clark v. Andrews, (C.C.A.

5th Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d.) 958.

71E. g., Freeman v. Fishman, (1923)

245 Mass. 222, 139 N. E. 846.

Compare 39 Harv. L. Rev. 785 and 35 Yale L J. 891.

72E. g., Roller v. Weigle, (1919) 49 D. C. App. 102, 261 Fed. 250.
Compare O'Regan v. White, [1919] 2 Ir. R. 339: and Topeka Water Sup-

ply Co. v. Root, (1895) 56 Kan. 187, 42 Pac. 715.
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absolute unanimity the writers agree (the problem has not arisen
in English law, but the broad statements of Fry and Halsbury
with respect to mutuality might be understood by some to point
in a contrary direction) that the objection of "lack of mutuality"
is without foundation while the contract lasts, especially where
there is reason to believe the plaintiff's privilege will not be exercised without reasonable cause. The courts, however, with sometimes surprisingly uncritical adherence to supposed authority in
ignorance of the latter's present significance, continue to dis73
agree.
None of the cases, on the other hand, deals with a situation
precisely or even approximately resembling that under consideration in this paper. That is to say, they do not deal with informational privileges, or with interim protection; most if not all have
to do directly with the specific performance of the ultimate transaction. They are concerned with oil and gas leases terminable by
the lessee, similar instruments relating to mining operations, contracts for continuous furnishing of power, personal service or
supplies which could be cancelled by the plaintiff, and purchase and
sale contracts where the plaintiff lacked statutory authority to
proceed.
Because cases of this latter type have heretofore been overlooked, they will be noticed briefly. The remainder of the general
discussion will be confined to two important cases in New York
and the Supreme Court.
Mlkanchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co.,71
previously discussed, is one. The optionee was granted relief
against a sale until the property had been properly offered to it
in spite of a showing that the optionee could not actually buy "without taking fresh statutory powers," this having been known to both
parties from the beginning. Similarly, in Devenish v. Brown,"
a vendor was granted specific performance against the vendee
although the plaintiff was incapacitated to sell until authority had
73

Dabney v. Key, (1922) 57 Calif. App. 762, 207 Pac. 921 (contract
to give a terminable lease), but see St. Joseph Hydraulic Co. v. Globe
Tissue-Paper Co., (1901) 156 Ind. 665, 59 N. E. 995; Knott v. Thomas,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 180 S. W. 1114 (optionee could rescind after election to buy); Hill Oil & Gas Co. v. White, (1916) 53 Okla. 748, 157 Pac.
710 (Guffey v. Smith, (1915) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed.
856, inapplicable in Okla.); Triumph Elec. Co. v. Thullen, (E.D. Pa.
1916) 228 Fed. 762 (assignment of patents under terminable employment;
see note in 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1000.)
74[19011 2 Ch. D. 37.
75(1856) 26 L. J. Ch. 23.
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been obtained from Parliament. In Alabama Water Co. v. Anniston,7 6 a city which had exercised an option to purchase a waterworks was given specific performance although it had not as yet
obtained the requisite permission from the voters through a referendum for the issuance of the necessary bonds. And in City of
Saginaw v. Consumer's Power Co.7 7 although the city was denied
specific performance of an electric service contract because it had
failed to live up to mandatory requirements of its charter respecting competitive bidding, it was allowed relief as the representative
of its inhabitants. None of the bills was held demurrable, but in
each of the first three cases relief was made dependent upon the
subsequent acquisition by the plaintiff of the necessary authority.
Mutuality was not mentioned in the first two cases, and in the last
two only in the sense of whether there was any contract. The
illegality prevented the creation of one with the city in the last
case but the city's acceptance of the offer in the Alabama case was
sufficient. These are not option problems, it is true, but they are
referred to here as illustrating a wholesome flexibility of decrees
in cases where in spite of everything the respective plaintiffs might
do they might never obtain from the legislature or the electorate
the requisite capacity to complete the contemplated deal. Yet they
are of one accord free from any dogma dependent upon what
might have happened if the case had been reversed and the
defendant had sought relief against the plaintiff as a test in the
present instance. It proved to be enough that the plaintiff was
not likely without cause to withdraw and that it would in good
faith seek the requisite authority. The defendant was not to be
excused from his own performance merely because of the present
uncertainty of what the parliament or the voters might do.
McCall Co. v. Wright,7 8 decided by the New York court of
appeals in 1910, enjoined an employe from violating a part of his
contract of hiring which was designed to prevent his entering the
70

(Ala. 1926) 110 So. 36.

77(1921) 213 Mich. 460, 182 N. W. 446.

Compare with Incorporated

Town of Laurens v. Gas & Elec. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1922) 282 Fed.
432, which was a case of the type cited in note 69, supra, the Michigan
court's suggestion in the principal case to the effect that a public utility
may not escape specific performance by a plea of lack of mutuality based
upon the fact that the inhabitants of a city have contracted to buy only
what they will need during a given period, the utility's legal obligation
irrespective of contract being to supply actual needs.
78(1910) 198 N. Y. 143, 91 N. E. 516, 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 249. Compare the same court's attitude toward an unexercised option to buy in
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, (1915) 214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856.
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service of a competing concern and imparting there the plaintiff
employer's trade secrets, in spite of a provision in the contract
entitling the plaintiff to terminate the contract of hiring upon
notice. Hiscock, J., said for a majority of the court (the dissent
was on other grounds) :
"A court of equity does not refuse under otherwise proper
circumstances to restrain a continuing violation of a valid subsisting obligation not to injure another, simply because that other has
the option to cancel the obligation by terminating the agreement
which creates it. It seems to me that no element of mutual obligation is involved. One party has furnished a good consideration
for which the other has agreed to refrain from doing certain
things, and it is no excuse for a violation of the agreement wh le
it lasts that the beneficiary may at some time terminate it ...
But again, considering the precise object of this action, I see no
principle making in favor of defendant in this case where the
plaintiff has performed and is anxious to execute the contract.
The defendant ought not to be allowed to urge as a defense that
this is not an executed contract, when it is his repudiation which.
alone, so
far as now appears, prevents it from being fully exe79
cuted."

Finally, although the court consciously refrained from passing
upon the exact question, it is submitted that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Guffey v. Smith,"0 decided in 1915, actually
established, or at least laid the basis for a later explicit establishment of, the same doctrine for the federal courts. The court held
that an oil and gas lessee's surrender clause did not prevent him
from having an injunction against the violation of his rights by
the lessor and a subsequent lessee of the same premises. Under the
law of Illinois, whence the case came, the lessee's surrender clause
had been held to deprive the case of mutuality. The decision and
language of the Supreme Court is therefore especially significant.
A part of the opinion follows:
"It next is insisted that, according to the general principles and
rules of equity administered in the Federal courts [which 'are not
determined by local laws or rules of decision, but by general principles, rules and usages of equity having uniform operation in
those courts wherever sitting'] the surrender clause constitutes an
insuperable obstacle to granting the relief sought, the argument
being that, as the complainants have a reserved option to surrender
the lease at any time, it cannot be specifically enforced in their
favor. The rule intended to be invoked has to do with the specific
performance of executory contracts, is restrained by many excep7O(1910) 198 N. Y. 153, 91 N. E. 516, 31 L R. A. (N.S.) 249.
80(1915) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L Ed. 856.
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tions, and has been the subject of divergent opinions on the part
of jurists and textwriters. Without considering it in other aspects,
we think it is without present application. Rightly understood,
this is not a suit for specific performance. Its purpose is not to
enforce an executory promise in a lease already given, but to protect a present vested leasehold, amounting to a freehold interest,
from a continuing irreparable injury calculated to accomplish its
practical destruction.... It comes with ill grace for the defendants
to say that they ought not to be restrained because, perchance, the
complainants may sometime exercise their option to surrender the
lease. We think this option, which has not been exercised, and
may never be, is not an obstacle to the relief sought."8 '
Yet the purchaser in a specifically enforceable executory contract for the purchase and sale of land or other property has an
equitable fee therein, 2 and if he has an option to withdraw has in
equity just what that lessee had at law, a defeasible estate no less
entitled to protection against a "practical destruction" by a sale to
others or a withholding of determinative information. Further,
in the McCall Case just referred to, after the quotation made, the
court went on to say:
"A perfectly familiar illustration of this class of actions is the
one brought by a vendor of real estate to restrain a violation by
the vendee of a restrictive covenant in the deed. There is at the
time no mutual obligation resting on the vendor. But the vendee
for a good consideration has agreed not to do certain things and I
apprehend it would not be a good defense to an action to restrain
his violation that the vendor might in
83 the future do something
which would terminate the obligation."
There the court in a case involving a purely executory contract for
personal service resorted for an illustration to a situation which
it is the fashion today to describe in terms of equitable property
interests.8 4 In effect, the New York court might as well have
said:
"Because the vendor, having an equitable estate in the land
of the covenantor may some day see fit to extinguish that is no
reason for denying an injunction against a practical demolition
thereof by the wrongful conduct of the owner of the servient
tenement."
Calling the oil and gas lessee's interest a freehold estate in land
does divert the problem into a category where our traditional ways
81(1915) 237 U. S. 114-115, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856.
82

Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd ed., sec. 314.
83(1910) 198 N. Y. 154, 91 N. E. 516, 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 249.
84
Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, (1917) 228 Mass. 242,
117 N. E. 244; 31 Harv. L Rev. 879.
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of thinking about injuries to the use of land insulate the case
against defenses similarly confined to executory contracts. Nevertheless, the point is that everything the court said about not
crossing the bridge created by the plaintiff's option to terminate
until it seemed likely that that would be necessary, applies with
equal force to the protection of validly subsisting executory contracts so long as they last. The plaintiff's power to extinguish
that which is thus temporarily protected stands in exactly the same
light in both instances. The conditions upon which it depends,
the actual likelihood of its exercise in view of its possessor's
demonstrated attitude, and its effect if resorted to in fact, are the
same. The Supreme Court's view that the lease created a determinable freehold was a boon to the oil and gas industry, partly
for the reason suggested at the beginning of this paragraph. The
reasons given for that view are, it is submitted, equally applicable
to similarly conditioned specifically enforceable contracts of every
sort.
In the light of the foregoing survey of the state of the law,
one cannot refrain from expressing disappointment at the decision
of the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit,
filed on April 21, 1927, in Electrtc Management and Engineering
Corporationv. United Power and Light Corporation (of Kansas)
et al.85 Without any dissent, the court, through Van Valkenburgh,
J., affirmed the decree of the district court for Kansas, sustaining
motions to dismiss for want of equity and denying leave to amend
the plaintiff's bill for specific performance. The allegations admitted by the motions to dismiss were substantially these :86
The contract was in writing, dated and entered into on November 12, 1925, and provided for the purchase and sale of approximately 97% of the common stock of the corporate appellee, a
Kansas public service corporation owning and operating various
electric light, heat and power, gas, water and ice plants, and street
and interurban railway systems within the State of Kansas.
The party designated in the contract as the purchaser, and the
appellant herein, is the Electric Management and Engineering
Corporation, a Delaware corporation, duly admitted to transact
business in the state of Kansas, and authorized by its charter to
acquire, own, hold, maintain, operate and manage electric light and
power, gas, water and ice plants and street and interurban railway
85(1927)

19 F. (2d.) 311.

"8This statement of facts is based upon the transcript of record, the
statement in both parties' briefs, and that made by the court.
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systems, as well as to purchase, acquire, own, hold and sell the
stocks and securities of corporations engaged in the operation of
such plants and systems.
The appellees are the Kansas corporation previously mentioned,
and five individuals, all citizens of the state of Kansas. The individual appellees, at all of the dates mentioned in the bill, were
stockholders of the corporate appellee owning not less than 77%
of its issued and outstanding common stock and were directors
of said corporation, and three were, at all of said times, the president, vice president and general manager, and secretary and general counsel of said corporation, respectively. Two of them were
designated in the contract as the sellers of the common stock involved, and acted both for themselves and in behalf of all of the
other common stockholders of the corporate appellee.
The principal features of the contract were these: It recited
that "in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants and agreements herein contained and the sum of ten dollars and other good
and valuable considerations paid by the purchaser to the sellers, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged," the sellers agreed to sell
and the purchaser agreed to buy the shares of stock heretofore
described, upon the terms previously summarized. The contract
contained eleven paragraphs of detailed representations, warranties and statements regarding the legal, engineering, physical and
financial condition of the corporation, and agreements as to the
adninistration and operation of its properties prior to the closing
date of December 2, 1925, these being uttered "to induce the purchaser to enter into this contract and to assume the expense of said
legal, engineering and auditing examinations above provided for
(the sellers in no event to be liable for the expense of said examination)." In addition there were attached to the contract a certain
balance sheet and condensed income account of the corporate appellee, similarly represented and warranted by the sellers to be true
and accurate.
Moreover, the sellers agreed to have a certain audit made by a
designated firm of accountants and to furnish this audit and a
twelve-months earnings statement to the purchaser (at the latter's
expense in the sum of not to exceed $2,500.00) on or before December 19, 1925; to deliver without expense to the purchaser certain
legal opinions rendered by a designated firm of attorneys regarding
real estate titles, franchises, contracts and other corporate matters.
for the use of the legal counsel of the purchaser; and to submit
for the inspection of the representatives of the purchaser all
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records, books, accounts, contracts, franchises, abstracts of title
and other papers of the corporation. The engineers or other representatives of the purchaser were assured free access to the power
plants, buildings and structures of the corporation, with means of
transportation furnished by the sellers, and in every way the
sellers were to assist in facilitating the examination contemplated.
The purchaser agreed "at the earliest date possible to cause to
be made a legal, engineering and auditing examination of the status
and properties and books of the said United Power and Light Corporation (of Kansas), and to verify the representations herein
made, and in the event that either said legal, engineering or auditing report be considered unsatisfactory by the purchaser (in its
sole discretion) the purchaser shall have the right to withdraw
from this contract and shall be under no obligations hereunder
and this contract shall be deemed to be null and void". Notice
was to be given by the purchaser to the sellers either of its willingness to complete the purchase or its election to withdraw from the
contract, on or before December 23, 1925. Detailed arrangements
were provided for closing in the event of acceptance.
During the month of November, 1925, the appellant sent its
agents to the City of Abilene, Kansas, to make, at its own expense,
such examinations as were reasonably necessary. Nevertheless,
without legal excuse, and in violation of their obligations under
the agreement, the sellers repudiated the contract in all of its
terms and refused to permit the proposed investigations and inspections to be made; refused to furnish any audit or earnings statements, any legal opinions, or any corporate books or records whatever, and in every way possible denied to appellant the privilege
which it had under the contract of reasonably informing itself
before completing the purchase of the stock.
Appellant, therefore, on December 3, 1925, filed its bill of complaint with attached copies of the contract, balance sheet and income account hereinabove referred to in the district court for
Kansas, setting out the above facts and others not now material,
and praying particularly (a) that the individual appellees be enjoined from disposing of any of their stock, (b) that the corporate
appellee be enjoined from transferring on its books any of the
stock in question and from issuing any new stock therefor, (c)
that the appellees be enjoined from preventing appellant's agents
from making the legal, engineering and auditing examinations of
the corporation's properties and affairs contemplated by the contract, (d) that the appellees be compelled to furnish the appellant
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with the audit, earnings-statement, legal opinions, and corporate
books and papers called for by the agreement, (e) for specific
performance of the contract according to its terms; and (f) for
general relief.
Appellant averred that it stood ready, willing and able to make
the examinations, investigations and audits provided for by the
contract for the purpose of verifying the representations therein
nade by the sellers, and in the event the results and reports of
said examinations, investigations and audits were satisfactory, it
stood ready, able and willing to complete the purchase of the stock
subject to all of the other terms of the contract; that the individual appellees were threatening to and were about to dispose of
the stock in question to persons other than the appellant, and to
put it beyond their power to comply with the provisions of this
contract; and that the object and purpose of this contract was
that of enabling appellant to acquire the control of The United
Power and Light Corporation (of Kansas) and of its various business enterprises, and to operate and manage the same, through the
purchase of more than a majority of its voting stock. A majority
of this stock could not be obtained in the open market, but was
closely held. It could only be had from these five individual
appellees and its pecuniary value per share was not readily ascertainable.
On December 18, 1925, the several appellees filed separate motions to dismiss the bill of complaint for want of equity. These
six motions save for one averment in that of the corporate appellee, not material here, were identical in terms. They urged that
the action should be dismissed because the complaint with its exhibits showed on its face (a) that the appellant was not entitled
to the relief sought or to any other relief as against any of the
appellees, (b) that the bill was without equity in that it did not
state a cause of action cognizable in a court of equity, (c) that the
alleged contract was a mere option contract, without mutuality and
without sufficient consideration, and that the option had never been
exercised, (d) that tlie alleged contract was a mere offer which
had never been accepted and which could not then be accepted
(or the option exercised) for the reason that before the offeree
(appellant herein) had done anything under the contract and before the bill of complaint had been filed, the offer had been revoked
and withdrawn, (e) that no binding contract for the sale of corporate stock had been created that might be subject to specific performance, (f) that the appellant had never agreed to perform or
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accept the contract as a whole, and was under no obligation to
purchase or to pay for the stock, (g) that the appellant sought
performance of only a part of the contract, and that the court,
since it could not decree performance of the whole contract, should
not interfere to enforce any part thereof, and (h) that the appellant could render any decree nugatory by exercising the privilege
reserved in the contract, in its sole discretion, to withdraw from
the contract and to render it thereby null and void, after the performance by the appellees of the things prayed for in the complaint.
On December 23, 1925, these motions were called up for argument before the district court for Kansas, Hon. John C. Pollock,
judge presiding. The court having, immediately after the conclusion of the argument, indicated what its ruling would be, appellant moved for leave to amend its bill of complaint. This motion
was overruled. The respective motions were then by the court
sustained and the bill dismissed, "without prejudice to any right
plaintiff may have if any to proceed at law." This decree was
affirmed.
The court's statement of facts inadvertently fails to make note
of two allegations. One, as italicized above, was that the purchaser
undertook to stand the entire expense of its own inspections and
the expense of the proposed audit by an outside accountant up to
$2,500. The other, similarly emphasized above, was that the
seller's representations were, as the contract recited, made in order
to induce the purchaser to enter into the contract and to assume
the expense of the inspections and audits mentioned. This indication that the sellers had taken the initiative in endeavoring to
sell the property to the purchaser, was significant. Both factors
were important as bearing upon the matter of consideration, the
purpose of the inspection clause, and the actual probabilities as
to the exercise of the withdrawal privilege. Especially, they
served to indicate the necessity for the case going to a full hearing
as contrasted with a virtual demurrer to the bill, before final
judicial action.
Gaining support from a statement in an encyclopedia relative to
fancy, taste or judgment based upon cases involving portraits,
plays, designs, clothing, etc., and from the literal words of the
contract, "in its sole discretion," and without analysis of the situation as a whole, the court finds the conditions governing the exercise of the optional power to withdraw subjective only, so as to
enable the purchaser to escape if it so desired irrespective of the
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facts or the reasonableness of its action, and free from any power
of the court to say that it should have been satisfied (if the facts
should warrant that view) even if it asserted that it was not.
Apparently unaware of McCall Co. v. Wright,8 7 and refusing
to recognize the significance of Epstein v. Gluckin88 and Guffey v.
Smnith 9 except as confined to the facts there involved, the court
lifts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens 0 out of its setting to emphasize the supposed fatal effect of this outstanding termination
privilege.
Without reference to any of the interim informational decrees
discussed in the earlier parts of this paper, and relying upon decisions dealing with entirely distinct questions, the court feels itself
unable to grant specific performance of the inspections alone for the
suggested reasons that to do so would be useless if plaintiff should
later decide to withdraw and that these provisions were an integral
and inseparable part of the contract as a whole. Yet the court
evidently conceives of the contract as divisible in another direction
for purposes of allocation of consideration. It says :"' "The sum
of $10, though nominal, was sufficient to support the contract and
every stipulation favorable to the buyer, including the option to
withdraw in its discretion." This is limited by the statement :92
"The payment of $10 was a consideration merely for the optional
privilege." The parties do not seem to have regarded the contract as a unit. The examinations were thought to be sufficiently
useful and separable to furnish a basis for the ultimate decision as
to withdrawal and to warrant promise to inspect, the initial payment of ten dollars and the undertaking to spend several thousand, not to mention the actual spending of several hundred
dollars, in attempting to make them. They dealt with the provisions, for inspection and those for the ultimate sale very differently,
when they required the purchaser to make the inspection but left
the final purchase to a limited extent optional. And all of the cases
on interim informational problems, even the court's bellwether of
Muttal Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens, viewed the production of the
data that was to serve as a basis for final action as deserving of
independent enforcement. The principal reason this was not ac87(1910) 198 N. Y. 143, 91 N. E. 516. 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 249.
88(1922) 233 N. Y. 490, 493-494, 135 N. E. 861.

89(1915) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856.
90(1915) 214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856.
O1Electric Management & Engineering Corporation v. United Power
& Light Corporation, (1927) 19 F. (2d.) 311, 313.
92Ibid. at p. 315.
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tually done in the case mentioned was because in view of the
defendant's probable conduct the provisions for arbitration by
nominees were practically unenforceable.
Although the immediate issue before the court was clearly
limited to the production of information alone, both by the bill
and the briefs, the court seems to think the purchaser was asking
for a conveyance of the stock while insisting upon the continuance
of its withdrawal power, and that the only consideration therefor
was the terminable promise to buy over which the court had no
control. Its inability to find the requirement of mutuality satisfied
is due mainly to that misunderstanding. The court is not unsympathetic with the requirements of what might perhaps be described
as the modern mutuality technique. 93 If it had realized that what
was mainly wanted was the enforcement of the clause providing
for the inspections, examinations and audits, it might then have
found in the initial payment of the ten dollars, in the purchaser's
promise to make the investigation at its own expense, and in the
actual expenditure of several hundred, an adequate exchange for
the defendant's production of data, without worrying about the
outstanding power to withdraw. Obviously, the parties could
never have contemplated a final election to complete the purchase
as any part of the price for the sellers' undertakings as to the inspections alone.
Assuming, however, that adequate protection to the sellers
would necessarily include an assurance that the purchaser would
buy if the results of the inspection, tested objectively, reasonably
warranted it, the court seems strangely impotent. The bill, as the
portion quoted by the court shows, asked for the inspection for the
purpose of verifying the representations made by the sellers in
the contract. The whole theory of the plaintiff's case as developed
in the briefs was that the exercise of the power to withdraw was
to depend upon whether the results of the examinations would
satisfy a reasonable person that these representations had been substantiated. Nevertheless, the court deemed itself powerless to deal
with the ultimate purchase by a conditional decree. This stands
in curious contrast to the confidence in the judicial initiative in this
respect expressed by judges whose language has been quoted elsewhere in this paper. 94 It would seem that assuming the sellers had
93
See Cook, The Present Status of the Lack of Mutuality Rule, 36
Yale 94L. J. 897.
And see the "continuous supervision of plaintiff" cases: H. L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice (C.C. Ala. 1910) 186 Fed. 204, 213; Zelleken v. Lynch,
(1909) 80 Kan. 746, 750, 104 Pac. 563, noted in 20 Mich. L Rev. 289,
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needed protection in this connection, the court might reasonably
have viewed the plaintiff's assertions in its bill and briefs as waiving any privilege it might originally have had under the contract
arbitrarily to cancel if it so desired even if something turned up
on the inspection to be unsatisfactory that was not related to any
of the representations, and even if the mere filing of the bill did
not automatically work to submit the plaintiff to any equitable
decree binding it that the court might find necessary for the protection of the sellers. 5 In effect, the court here unconsciously
measures mutuality by the terms of the contract as written, when
it throws up its hands because in terms there found as distinguished
from the situation on the hearing, the plaintiff's undertakings were
to make an examination and to verify the representations and its
satisfaction was a matter for "its sole discretion" with respect to
the result of either test.
The hearing in the district court was had on the last day of the
plaintiff's optional period. It was clear that only the sellers'
breach had caused the delay. It is true the record did not disclose
the ground of the motion. Nevertheless, the nature and importance
of the only possible ground for leave to amend, namely, the unexpired privilege to buy the stock sight unseen,9 seems sufficiently
obvious. It would have been fairer practice to have allowed the
plaintiff a reasonable time in which to determine whether or
not to exercise its option favorably to the defendents, and thus
"supply the missing quality of lack of mutuality of remedy,"
as the court thought necessary.
414; La Follette v. La Follette Water, Light & Tel. Co., (C.C.A. 6th
Cir. 1918) 252 Fed. 762, 774, noted in 32 Harv. L. Rev. 439 and in 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 436; Montgomery Traction Co. v. Montgomery Light and
Water Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1916) 229 Fed. 672, 676; Elk Ref. Co. v.
Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co., (1922) 92 W. Va. 479, 115 S. E. 431, 434;
Great Lakes Co. v. Scranton Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1917) 239 Fed. 603,
609; Mun. Gas. Co. v. Lone Star Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 259 S. W.
684, 690; but see Ariz. Ed. Co. v. So. Sierras Co., (C. C. A. 9th Cir.
1927) 17 F. (2d.) 739, 740; Universal Co. v. General Motors, (E. D. Mich.
1927)9520 F. (2d) 966. All but the last two exhibit a splendid virility.
See the cases collected in 21 Corpus Juris, Equity, secs. 849, 859, and
in the article referred to in note 61, supra.
96Compare the materials referred to in notes 2, 25 and 54, supra.

